Cognitive biases in risk management by Siefert, William Thomas
Scholars' Mine 
Masters Theses Student Theses and Dissertations 
Fall 2007 
Cognitive biases in risk management 
William Thomas Siefert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses 
 Part of the Systems Engineering Commons 
Department: 
Recommended Citation 
Siefert, William Thomas, "Cognitive biases in risk management" (2007). Masters Theses. 4590. 
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses/4590 
This thesis is brought to you by Scholars' Mine, a service of the Missouri S&T Library and Learning Resources. This 
work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the 
permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 










WILLIAM THOMAS SIEFERT 
 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 





___________________           __________________ 
Cihan H. Dagli, Advisor              Ann Miller           
         
___________________ 
Eric D. Smith 
 






















WILLIAM THOMAS SIEFERT 
All Rights Reserved 






The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship of risk 
management/mitigation and the people who practice the discipline.  Much has 
been written concerning risk and the analytical ways that it can be measured.  
The need for accurate and timely risk mitigation has accelerated with the pace of 
new and replacement programs.  A part of the process that needs to be updated 
is that risk needs to be seen as systems attribute, much the same as cost, 
schedule and technical compliance. 
It is absolutely necessary that today’s Systems Engineers develop and 
follow a Risk Management and Mitigation Plan in the early phases of the project.  
It is also important that the appropriate Risk Management/Mitigation process be 
selected. 
This thesis contends that most Risk Management/Mitigation programs fail 
to be as effective as they could be due to a number of mostly overlooked drivers, 
such as motivation and cognitive biases.  The issue of cognitive biases is very 
seldom addressed.  When questioned, most engineers purport to not have any 
biases.  They insist that they use only logic, reasoning, and math to make 
decisions.   
A set of data was collected and reviewed for this thesis.  The data 
presented shows that cognitive biases do affect the risk management/mitigation 
process.  Knowledge of these biases and their potential impact on a project will 
lead to better risk management.
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Risk Management and Mitigation have become extremely important and 
widely used in modern Systems Engineering.  The need for accurate and timely 
risk mitigation has accelerated with the pace of new and replacement programs.  
Since the 1990s the time to market has been compressed at an extremely rapid 
pace, with the consequence that the effects of a realized risk are both more 
serious and much more difficult to overcome. 
One example of the accelerating pace of new programs is in the military 
arena.  In the 1970s three to four years was the norm for medium sized projects 
and major projects could last a decade.  Today, medium sized projects usually 
have a two to three year time to production.  This compression is also felt in 
major projects.  Projects that in the 1970s would have taken a decade are now  
completed in two to three years.  The commercial world has compressed 
schedules even further; projects that today take six months would have taken 
eighteen months a decade ago.  
Keeping modern requirements in mind, it is absolutely necessary that 
today’s Systems Engineers develop and follow a Risk Management and 
Mitigation Plan in the early phases of the project.  It is also important that the 
appropriate Risk Management/Mitigation process be selected.  For example, a 
process used by NASA for the Mars Rover program is probably too complex for 
the development of a single piece of electronics.  Although it is true that risk 
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management is a universal program/project requirement, the approach taken 
should not be “one size fits all.”  A system that is not appropriate for the task at 
hand should not be used.  
This thesis contends that most Risk Management/Mitigation programs fail 
to be as effective as they could be due to a number of mostly overlooked drivers, 
such as motivation and cognitive biases.  It is the author’s assertion that most 
risk programs are less effective than they could be due to resistance from both 
engineers and program managers.  Two basic examples of this type of passive 
resistance are:   
1) Many engineers do not want to admit that there are any risks 
associated with the project [Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996].  
2) Many program managers do not want to present negative aspects of 
their program to higher management or the customer [Kasperson and 
Kasperson, 1996]. 
In the first case, many engineers do not see the need for a risk 
management program.  They feel that they are dealing with the risks on a day-to-
day basis and do not need any interference from management in doing their job.  
Others feel that showing a risk reflects badly on the engineers’ ability to design 
and deliver a compliant artifact.  In any case the tendency of human nature is to 
deny and hide that which makes one look bad.  
In the second case, management has a responsibility to foster a culture of 
openness which includes not “shooting the messenger” in the case of perceived 
bad news.  Management also needs to work with its customers so that both have 
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the same approach to risk.  The customer needs to work as a part of the “team” 
to help mitigate risks at all stages of the project. 
It is not an accepted fact that risk is an attribute of the systems 
architecture in the same way as cost, schedule, and performance. Once 
management begins treating risk as a system attribute the process of risk 
management will enter a new era. [Dagli, 2007]  
Figure 1.1 illustrates Risk as a Systems Attribute.  The central premise is 
that risks are hidden when it is possible to do so.  Given that risk is a negative 
attribute of the system and that the general tendency is to hide risks [Kasperson 
and Kasperson, 1996], a system to help disclose risks is necessary.  The 
approach shown in Figure 1.1 offers a path to follow for the acceptance of Risk 




Figure 1.1 Risk as a systems attribute 
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1.2 MOTIVATION    
The motivation for risk management/mitigation is multifaceted.  Current 
industry trends prescribe addressing and eliminating most, if not all, risks to a 
project.  While this is an admirable goal, it is not generally achievable in the real 
world. However, this admirable goal keeps driving the development of risk 
management/mitigation.   
The goal of this thesis was to determine if there are any practical methods 
in use in the military/aerospace industry that address the psychological aspects 
of risk management.  For instance, when management decrees that there will be 
“risk management/mitigation” for all programs, what subjective or psychological 
perceptions interfere with the process? Is risk management/mitigation really 
practiced? Is it effective?  
The psychological pieces of risk management are not well understood by 
most engineers and engineering managers and, thus, are not handled properly 
by most risk programs.  In fact, the psychological aspect of risk management  is 
generally not addressed at all [Saad and Hsu, 2003],  [Snyder and Buede, 2000] 
and [Gilb, 2002].   Each of the studies cited above are excellent examples of the 
technical and analytical approach to risk management, but none addresses the 
psychological aspects of the process. 
The issue of cognitive biases is very seldom addressed.  When 
questioned, most engineers purport to not have any biases.  They insist that they 
use only logic, reasoning, and mathematics to make decisions.  This is, of 
course, not true at all.  All people are influenced by outside forces and factors 
such as education, culture, corporate culture, and experience.  Another such 
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area of influence is cognitive bias. Cognitive Biases occur despite the subject’s 
intent to obtain the correct answer or the predisposition towards a particular 
solution or path in any given set of circumstances. 
Of the technical/engineering papers researched by the author, not one 
was devoted to the impact of human beings on the risk management process.  
All of these papers address technical issues and how to manage them, but none 




1.3 PROBLEM DEFINITION    
The problem is not a simple one.  Asking why people often resist the 
process of risk management leads to many more questions.  Basic human nature 
tends to avoid that which makes us look bad, or is perceived as making us look 
bad.  
Most people, engineers included, have learned that, in many situations, 
admitting even a perceived weakness means opening oneself up to criticism from 
both peers and management.  The receiver of criticism often perceives it as 
punishment.  There is a natural tendency to believe in oneself and to take 
criticism not intended as personal as an attack on the individual.   
This bias of not admitting the possibility of having made an error or not 
knowing the correct course to follow is perhaps the most common one in 
industry.  Many an engineer has forced data to fit a preconceived desirable 
outcome.  Perhaps the most notable example is NASA and the Challenger 
launch decision, as illustrated by Vaughan.  [Vaughan, 1996] 
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A certain amount of emotional involvement is necessary by most people; 
otherwise, progress is often not made in the project.  The exact amount of 
emotion attached to any project will vary from person to person and among 
corporate cultures. This is true no matter what the project and no matter who the 
participants are.  A sense of ownership is required to ensure that the project is 
completed on schedule and meets more than just the minimum requirements.  It 
is not an act of serendipity that large corporations like Wal-Mart try to instill in 




1.4 INTEGRATED PROCESS TEAMS 
All members of the project team, including engineering, program 
management, company management, and the customer, must be a part of the 
process for it to provide the available results.  It is important that risk 
management be addressed on more that just a “pro-forma” basis.   
It has been the author’s experience that a positive team approach to risk 
management can and often does provide excellent results.  Even when the 
results are not as positive as were hoped for, the fact that there was a real team 
effort minimizes negative impact on the team, including the customer. 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that everyone on the team must 
participate in the process of risk management.  A pro-forma approach by any 
member of the team will often lower the likelihood of a successful outcome.  The 




Often, little attention is paid to risks until they become serious.  Even 
companies with a reasonable risk management program suffer from this 
scenario.  One example of this failure was a program that did not apply the Risk 
Management Program in place to a supplier.  This supplier had a history of 
making leading edge products.  The supplier was small and was dependent on 
one individual for the innovative designs that made their products leading edge. 
This dependence was well known at the company by both engineering and 
management, yet little attention was paid to the risk of being dependent on a 
single person.  During a critical phase in a major project, the key individual 
became sick and was unable to complete the project.   
What are risks and why are they important to a project?  Risks are the 
areas in a project that are often unbounded by the scope or requirements of the 
project which can have a negative effect on its outcome.  Being sometimes 
unbounded or fuzzy, they are often very hard to predict and can cause much 
damage to the project if not dealt with in the appropriate manner. This condition 
of uncertainty is true for all aspects of life and industry.  No one wants to admit 
that what he or she did is anything less than what was required for the task.  This 
condition holds true for engineers, program managers, janitors, and even CEO’s. 
The culture of the organization has an impact on the way potentially 
negative information, including risk information, is handled.  If the culture is 
punitive, with a “shoot the messenger mentality,” then employees will be less 
likely to disclose any negative information.  If the culture is less punitive, 
employees will be more likely to disclose negative information.  However, an 
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open and non-punitive culture still does not guarantee that negative information 
will be disclosed.   
One example is the company for which I currently work.  There is little 
reason to hide potentially negative risk information.  Still, however, many 
engineers and program managers only provide the barest information on risks 
and often present them in the most favorable light possible.  A demonstrated 
managerial commitment to bi-directional risk management communication is 
required.  Without this commitment people will not change their approach to risk 
disclosure.  
The objective of this thesis is to make a case for change to both the 
engineering community and both engineering management and company 
management that will begin the process of better disclosure of risks.  Once all 
parties begin the process of how risk viewed and see more the human part of the 









2.1 RISK LITERATURE   
A review of the literature on risk management/mitigation was undertaken 
in the area of human interaction and risk management and mitigation.  During the 
research for this thesis no published, engineering oriented data was uncovered 
on the subject of human interactions and risk management.  Examples of this 
lack of published data on the subject are the over twenty-five papers reviewed by 
the author from the International Council of System Engineering (INCOSE) 
library.  Of the twenty-five papers reviewed, which span more than a decade, not 
one addressed the human interaction of risk directly.  
Significant literature was found on the process of change management.  
The processes used to promote change in an organization are similar to those 
needed to promote the human issues in the risk management process.  If people 
resist change, it follows that they will resist risk management unless risk 
management/mitigation is presented in a non-threatening manner and with the 
full support of management. 
One commonly overlooked issue with risk management is of the problem 
of cultural inertia.  Cultural inertia must be overcome with sustained attention to 
risk mitigation [Williams, 1978].  Newton’s first law of motion is abstractly 





2.2 RISK    
Much has been written that addresses the technical aspects of risk 
management.  Helm [Helm, 2004] addresses the issue of teaching students and 
engineers how to effectively create a risk statement, as well as the process of 
tracking mitigation a plan to completion.  Helm does not address the underlying 
issue of why disclosure is important, other than to say it is important in order to 
make systems work. 
The process of risk management must include human aspects in order to 
be as successful.  When psychological aspects are left out, the risk 
management/mitigation process is incomplete.  Most people working in a 
technical field do not consider the human part of the equation.  Much time is 
spent devising ways to track and to measure both risk and mitigation efforts, but  
little or no effort is spent working to understand the human side of the process.   
Real risk arises from both uncertainty (unknown relations and parameters) 
and known probabilistic relations.  With what probability will an event happen and 
with what consequence?  There are many terms used to express these 
dimensions.  Likelihood or frequency of occurrence is often used in place of 
probability.  The words consequence, severity, effect, and value are also often 
used interchangeably.  Whatever terms you choose, an uncertain or probabilistic 
event with negative impact must be considered a risk.  This relationship is shown 














Risk Known Distributions 
 
2.3 RISK DEFINITIONS  
Risk Management:  Risk management is all of the activities taken to 
identify, quantify and minimize risk to the project.  This activity occurs at all phase 
of the project, not just engineering [Snyder and Buede, 2000]. 
 Risk Mitigation:  Risk Mitigation is process of attempting to minimize the 
impact of a risk to the program.  Risk mitigation may include such activities as 
searching for new sources of supply, developing new technology or just 
assigning additional manpower to track and report on the status of the risk and its 
impact on the project. 
Resistance to Change:  Resistance to change is the natural human 
reaction to a new and potentially threatening circumstances.  Fear of the 
unknown is one of the forces that cause many people to resist change.  Inertia is 
also a major contributor to resistance.  Why change when what we have 
produces known predictable results? 
Cultural Inertia:  Cultural Inertia must be overcome, whether through risk 
mitigation or change management.  The analogy to Newton’s first law of motion 
applies even to people or organizations.  Newton's first law of motion is often 
stated as:  An object at rest tends to stay at rest and an object in motion tends to 
stay in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon 
by an unbalanced force. 
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Feelings in Risk:   Humans quickly and instinctively perceive negative 
circumstances.  A common example is the human reaction to danger and the 
fight or flight decision that is made in real time [Slovic, Finucane, Peters and 
MacGregor, 2002].  
Risk Mitigation as analysis:  The engineering approach to problem solving 
is generally that of logic, reason, and a scientific approach to the problem.  This 
approach is preferred by engineers and program managers because it is 
predictable and gives the appearance of being controllable.  If you make a plan 
and follow the plan everyone is comfortable that you are doing the right things 
[Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor, 2002]. 
Politics in Risk:  The clash between the real world and the perfect world 
most engineers would like to work in.  A solution to a problem, no matter how 
elegant or appropriate, will not be implemented if it is not acceptable to all 
parties.  If the customer or management does not like a solution the solution will 
not be implemented [Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor, 2002]. 
Schedule Risk:  The potential negative impact to the schedule if the risk is 
realized.  This is usually expressed in terms of a slippage or delay in the time it 
will take to complete the project. 
Cost Risk:  The potential impact to the project budget if the risk is realized.  
This is usually expressed in terms of dollars or man hours.  Either method shows 
a potential increase in the cost of the project. 
Technical Risk:  The potential that the risk, if realized, will negatively 
impact the performance of the project. Often this type of risk receives the most 
attention although, in most cases, it is the least important type of risk.  Lower 
  
13 
technical performance will often be accepted in lieu of higher cost or a slip in 
schedule. 
Risk Seeking:  Risk seeking is observed in two classes of decision 
problems.  First; overtly considering a small probability of winning a large prize 
over the expected value of the prize.  Second; risk seeking is prevalent in the 
decision between a sure loss and a greater loss [Trevesky and Kahneman, 
2004]. 
Loss aversion:  Basic phenomena of choice under both risk and 
uncertainty; risk of loss is considered worse than prospect of gain [Trevesky and 




2.4 RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
The primary method for the Architect to use is a structured tool or method 
for listing, and tracking the status of risks as a regular part of the project cycle.  
The tool selected should be appropriate to the type and scope of the project.  
Numerous tools are available, such as those shown by Gilb [Gilb, 2002].  The 
methods described by Snyder and Buede [Snyder and Buede, 2000], are 
appropriate for smaller projects with somewhat less complexity,  while the 
method described by Gilb [Gilb, 2002] is more appropriate for larger, more 
complex projects.  This thesis concerns the application of risk management to 
smaller projects or sub-sets of larger more complex projects. 
Risk management to most people, including engineers and program 
managers, generally means an engineering problem.  More than just an 
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engineering problem, risk management/mitigation is a systems attribute in the 
same way as are cost, scheduling, and technical compliance.  Until Risk is seen 
as a system attribute and pursued in the same manner as other attributes, risk 
management will be less effective than it could be. 
An example of risks not always being considered an engineering issue is 
consideration of a perspective supplier’s viability.  Can the supplier meet the 
long-term requirements of the project?  Is the supplier able to sustain himself 
financially for the life of the project?  
During the early 1980s a major aerospace program experienced one 
example of this type of risk during the redesign of a power supply.  The supplier 
chosen was qualified to manufacture the part required, but no attention was paid 
to its ability to sustain its business.    The business base was not diverse enough 
to withstand the loss of its major customer.  Once this major customer withdrew 
its business, the supplier was almost unable to continue to provide the required 
parts for the missile program.  Had the program utilized an appropriate form of 
risk management during the development and supplier selection phase, the crisis 
would most likely have been avoided.  Instead, the supplier almost stopped the 
program from delivering hardware.  Only financial intervention by the program 
allowed the supplier to continue to deliver until another source could be 
developed. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the tool selected be appropriate for the 
type of project being managed.  In this case “one size fit all” can be a disaster.  
The use of a tool designed for a large project with a fairly long time line will not 
work well or even work at all on smaller projects with a short timeline.  An 
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example is the Space Shuttle; NASA has a time line of decades with multiple 
thousands of suppliers and different assemblies and parts.  A tool used to track 
risks at the highest level of the project will not delve deep enough for some risks 
and for others will examine in too much detail.  In either case, the misapplication 




2.5    PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT    
The psychological aspects of risk management are those least understood 
by systems engineers and architects.  Engineering is a discipline of facts and 
figures with an emphasis on exact answers.  The equation must always balance. 
While it is true that the equation must always balance, sometimes the 
terms used to balance it are alien to the engineer.  As a profession, engineers 
tend to precisely measure and predict outcomes of projects.  Any approach that 
does not use this system is often held as suspect and not given much credibility.  
There are, however, almost dichotomies in any project.  The belief that a solution 
will be found even though one is currently not visible.  What is this belief, if not a 
non–specific approach to a problem?  In general there is a belief that there is a 
solution to the problem and that engineering will find it. 
Some reasons for resistance to risk management from a psychological 
perspective, along with their primary causes are shown below in Table 2.2.  
The partial list of reasons featured in Table 2.2 are compiled from a survey 
of Systems Engineering graduate students.  While interesting, thought provoking, 
and possibly the subject of future research, the data is not being used in this 
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thesis.  It is mentioned merely to show that thought was given too many areas of 
research before settling on cognitive biases as the main theme. 
The psychological aspects of risk management are complex and very 
important to the successful completion of any risk management program.  
Ignoring this aspect of the process will lead to less achievable results than if the 
psychological aspects are utilized.   
 
 
Table 2.2 Reasons for hiding risks 
 
    
Reason for Resistance Psychological Term 
Not wanting to be seen as fallible Fear of ridicule 
Fear of ridicule by peers Fear of ridicule 
Fear of ridicule by management Fear of ridicule 
Ego, I don't make mistakes Insecurity 
If I do my job this will go away Misplaced Ego 
Corporate culture Security 
Embarrassment Fear of ridicule 
Not sure how to handle Insecurity 
This is not my job Transference 
 
 
Understanding the subject of Cognitive Biases can help increase the 
positive results of any risk management program.  This is not to say that 
understanding the psychological impacts on the process will immediately cure all 
the ills of the process.  However, understanding psychological impacts will make 
successful implementation easier and provide more consistent results. 
In general, risk management in today’s engineering environment is 
approached from an analytical angle.  Little, if any, attention is paid to other 
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influences that affect the process.  For example, what of the human nature of 
feelings?  What of the political parts of risk management? The work of Helm 
[Helm, 2004], Langenberg and De Wit [Langenberg and De Wit, 1999], and 
Ramchandani et al. [Ramchandani, Ligon, Rabensteine and Bhatia, 1994] 
exemplifies the analytical approach. 
Most engineers understand that to ignore the political parts of risk 
management is counterproductive to the health of the project.  It does not take 
very much time in to see or feel the effects of politics on a project.  If a risk’s 
outcome can have negative political consequences, much effort is put into finding 
an acceptable solution.  This political aspect of risk management is well 
described by Slovic et al. [Slovic, Finucane, Peters and McGregor, 2002] as a 
part of risk management that demands particular attention.   
An example of politics in Risk Management/Mitigation is that the schedule 
is often more important than full technical compliance. Even budget is often not 
as important as meeting a deadline.  Anything that affects the schedule 
negatively will receive priority and management attention. 
Another aspect of risk management is intuition, the fast and often accurate 
perception of the problem.  While many engineers and program managers 
actively use the intuitive approach to problem solving, including risk 
management, it is downplayed and even ridiculed when it is verbalized.  The only 
real approach to risk management is the analytical method.   
The heuristic about progress being “90% perspiration and 10% inspiration” 
is especially appropriate in this area.  Risk management is not always just 
analytical and political.  Intuition also plays a major role, though it is most often 
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unreported and downplayed.  How many times have you heard “I had a flash of 
inspiration”?  If questioned, the person would downplay the intuitive part and 
focus on the result. 
Another area of importance is how risk is communicated to all 
stakeholders.  Leiss [Leiss, 1996] lists several different ways of communicating 
risk to stakeholders in a positive manner.  These methods include such ideas as 
“all we have to do is make them partners,” or, “all we have to do is show them 
that they have accepted similar risks in the past.”  These approaches show the 





2.6   COMMUNICATION IN RISK MANAGEMENT   
The idea of formalized risk management is not new. Over the years there 
have been multiple ways developed to track and manage risks.  Perhaps the 
most common method is the use of the ubiquitous, basic “Risk Cube”.  (See 
Figure 2.1) 
The cube is used as a visual aid in the representation of risk likelihood and 
consequence.  The closer the risk is to the lower left corner of the cube the lower 
the risk is to the project.  This encompasses both the likelihood and the 
consequence of the bad or negative outcome.  This basic approach to graphical 
representation has several areas of weakness, including a lack of granularity and 
a repeatable way of locating the risk on the chart. 
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A repeatable method of presenting risk data is generally required for 
human beings to easily comprehend the situation.  Many people cannot relate 
pure statistics and facts to a real world situation.  If a repeatable method of 
presentation is used, the task of communicating a risk is made easier.  It is, 
however, important that the tool used be appropriate to the task.  The tool must 




Figure 2.1 Risk cube 
 
 
The cube shown in Figure 2.2 represents a major step towards a 
repeatable way to measure risk probability and consequence.  The five sided 
cube provides sufficient granularity without causing stress in deciding which 
position is correct.  This cube, along with a reasonable set of definitions, will 
provide the Systems Engineer, or any user, with a repeatable way of categorizing 
and assigning value to risks.  Once the system is more user friendly the use of 
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the system becomes a routine task that needs to be attended to on a regular 
basis. 
Qualitative descriptions or definitions of criteria must be established for 
each of the squares in the cube for both likelihood and consequence.  These 
criteria or definitions add stability and repeatability to the process of risk 
management/mitigation.  Without repeatability, the process loses much of its 
value and will most likely be seen as a process of minimal gain by all concerned.  
This process is often called risk mapping.  
A structured approach to risk management must be utilized.  A lack of 
structure will undermine the value of the process and limit its effectiveness.  This 
process should include both a set of definitions for the mapping and a logical 
plan or approach to the entire process.  

















  Figure 2.3 illustrates a set of definitions that can be utilized as part of a 
structured risk mapping process.  These definitions for mapping provide a 
reasonably clear path for mapping risk.  
 
          




Using a clear path and a structured process such as the one shown in 
Figure 2.4, a repeatable and predictable risk management program can be 
implemented.  It is essential that a structured path be followed.  Without 
structure, a risk management process will fail.  An in depth look at the process is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the following discussion will provide some 
details of the process requirements. 
The risk management process is broken down into several basic steps 
with the final step being to reevaluate the risk and perhaps identify a new risk. 
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Risk Identification is always the first step.  It is critical to accurately identify 
the risk. Otherwise, effort may be expended in mitigating the wrong risk.   
 
 
Figure 2.4 Risk management process 
 
How big is the risk?  What is the likelihood of its occurrence? Answering 
these questions requires that the risk identifier and owner, who is not necessarily 
the same person, along with the rest of the project team, come to a consensus.  
This step is critical to the process because it sets the tone for the rest of the 
evaluation. 
 Next, the consequence to the program in the event that the risk is actually 
realized must be evaluated.  Will there be a major impact on the project?   Will 
the delay significantly affect the budget? 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION TO BIASES  
As with most human endeavors, cognitive bias is possible in the process.  
Hidden biases often color or distort the perception of the problem.  Humans are 
the sum of their experiences and education, as well as their emotional or non-
rational reaction to circumstances. 
Research by Smith [Smith, 2006] and Bahill et al. [Bahill, Son, Smith and 
Piattelli-Palmarini, 2007], among others, leads to the conclusion that people are 
generally too confident in their ability to solve complex issues, despite evidence 
to the contrary.  An important facet of risk management is the understanding that 
there is not much difference between risk management and a trade study.  As 
such, risk management needs to have a similar approach taken to reach a 
solution. 
In the area of Risk Management there are many biases.  Some of them 
are overconfidence, training in an area of expertise, aversion to ambiguity in any 
situation, and life experiences.  While this list is not exhaustive, it does illustrate 
that these biases are common and not unique to any given person or 
circumstance. 
Every project and all of the participants in the project are susceptible to 
biases.  In the area of risk management they are most common in that they tend 
to show up as strongly held prejudices about how to solve the problem at hand.  
Overconfidence causes the belief that the risk can be overcome, which is not 
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always true.  Or a rationalization that since a solution is not immediately obvious 
there is no workable solution available, potentially causing changes to the project 




3.2 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE SITUATION 
An example of biases in a single project occurred with a piece of 
equipment that had been in production for several decades.  Suddenly this piece 
of equipment started exhibiting numerous false failures during initial instillation 
and operation.  These failures were not repeatable and seemingly unrelated.  
Two distinct types of failures were exhibited.  Initially, the failures were perceived 
as irritating and unimportant by all parties concerned.  As time progressed and 
the frequency of both types of failures increased, it became apparent that there 
was a need for corrective action. 
The engineer responsible for the project was very experienced and well 
qualified.  He had many years experience as both a project engineer and a 
designer, which lead to a cognitive bias of overconfidence.  Another cognitive 
bias in play was the fear of management’s displeasure.  Management wanted the 
problem solved with a very minimum impact and little cost. After all, the unit had 
been working for several decades; how could there be anything wrong with the 
design? 
The causes of the problem in fact both hardware and software design 
deficiencies.  Neither deficiency had previously presented at the same time and 
the intermittent nature of the failures masked the real issues.   
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The corrective action required included both hardware and software 
changes to address the deficiencies.  Once the design deficiencies were 
corrected, the piece of equipment returned to its normal state of proper 
operation. 
The biases of overconfidence and fear of displeasing management played 
a very important role in the process of risk management.  The bias of 
overconfidence caused the engineer to overlook several clues that, when 




3.3 COGNATIVE BIASES IN ACTION    
A database of risk assessment was reviewed for potential biases.  The 
review showed that there are probably cognitive biases at play in risk 
management/mitigation plans.  The database spans a five year period and 
includes 742 records.  A compiled listing of the data is shown in the Appendix. 
The data in Appendix is in its original state from the data base.  The three 
columns are labeled Risk ID, Likelihood, and Consequence.  The data from the 
database contained much more information which was eliminated due to its lack 
of relevance to this study.  Some records were eliminated from the study due to 
their lack of an entry in the Likelihood or Consequence column.    
The data was sorted in both ascending and descending order as part of 
the analysis process.  At all times the relationship to the Risk ID number was 
maintained.   
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The data in the Appendix was sorted for both Likelihood and 
Consequence in order to present a clearer picture of the forces in play.  Several 
forms of graphical representation were evaluated for clarity of presentation.  A 
bubble chart is used to present a graphic overall view of the distribution of the 
original data, see Figure 3.1.  A cursory analysis shows that much of the data is 
clustered near of the center of the likelihood and consequence ranges.  This 
clustering will be developed further later in the thesis. 
An analysis of the distribution of the consequence of the risk data was 
done with the results shown in Figure 3.2.  This form of the data shows that early 
in the program that more risks are shown with higher consequence.  This data 
makes sense in that it is probable that while more activity is talking place more 
risks will be discovered.  A trend line, least squares regression, was added to 
smooth out the effects of the outliers in the data.  This clustering of the data adds 
validity to the idea that risk should be treated as a systems attribute and tracked 
as such along with cost schedule and technical performance. 
Figure 3.3 shows the likelihood data from Appendix A.  Probability theory 
indicates that translations will occur towards the center of the range.  The data 
support this.  Probability Theory indicates that translations from 5 to 4 and 4 to 3 
will be of grater magnitude than the translations from 1 to 2 and 2 to 3.  The data 
shows more than just plausible evidence of this effect.   
The consequence of the risk realization is shown in Figure 3.4.  This data 
also shows that the tendency to place estimates in the center of the range holds 
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Figure 3.4 Consequence distribution of risks 
 
 
This tendency to frame towards the center is illustrated by Schwarz           
[Schwarz, 1990] and the question relating to the number of hours spent viewing 
television.  Two groups of subjects were given a bounded range of hours divided 
into five time frames, plus an unbounded or open ended range.  Both groups of 
subjects gave the same average answer to the question.  The middle field was 
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selected predominately by both groups of subjects, yet the times for each group 
of subjects were significantly different.   
This same force is at play in estimating of the severity of a risk’s 
consequence.  In the Optimism Bias, the subject does not believe things are that 
bad.  Fear of Reprisal bias reflects the subject’s belief that he or she might loose 
his or her job. Both of these biases are examples of cognitive biases effecting 




3.4 PROSPECT THEORY 
 
Prospect Theory, as put forth by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979], challenged the then prevailing Expected Utility Theory as a 
descriptive model for decision making under risk.  This theory documented flaws 
in Expected Utility Theory and provided explanations for them.    
Prospect theory contends that human decision making entails two stages: 
an editing stage and an evaluation phase [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979].  In the 
editing stage, objective probabilities and values are assessed through human 
utility functions, while the evaluation stage entails the multiplication of expected 
utility products.  For the purposes of this thesis, only the editing stage is 
important, since the distortion of probabilities and values is examined, but not the 
resultant risk as a product of multiplication.   
One of the effects of Prospect Theory’s screening stage is that values are 
considered not in an absolute sense (from zero), but subjectively from the 
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reference point established by the subject’s perspective and wealth before a 
decision [Smith, 2006].  This is an example of the psychological phenomenon 
called framing. 
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between estimated and actual 
probability and consequence [Tversky and Kahneman, 2004].  The hypothesis is 
that the actual objective probability of a risk being realized and its perceived 
probability is not the same.  There exists a tendency to overestimate small 
probabilities and underestimate large probabilities.   Another way to state this is 
as the risk gets more personal the impact of the losses become more important. 
A graph showing how objective values translate into subjective utilities is 
shown in Figure 3.6.  The utility functions for gains are concave and losses are 
convex.   
It is important to note the significant difference in magnitude with which 
gains and losses are subjectively valued is approximately a 1-to-2 ratio. 
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] 
A modification of the curve in Figure 3.6 yields more interesting data.  The 
inclusion of an expected utility line in Figure 3.7 shows that gains are always 






















This is an important example of cognitive bias in the area of risk 
management/mitigation.  Simply put most people are more concerned with 
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losses than in the gains available.  The prospect of loosing some wealth is far 










3.5 PROSPECT THEORY AND THE RISK CUBE 
Figure 3.8 is obtained by combining Figure 3.5 (subjective probability 
assessment compared to actual, objective probabilities) and Figure 3.6 (value 
curve) with Figure 2.2 (risk cube) 
Figure 3.5 is used in its complete form for the probability part of the figure.  











Figure 3.8 Prospect theory and the risk cube 
 
 
down played and pushed towards the center of the cube.  A risk entering the 
lower part of the curve, lower risk, has the tendency to be pushed towards the 
center of the cube. 
A modified form of Figure 3.6 is used for the severity axis of the curve.  
The upper right quadrant of Figure 3.6 is used and rotated 90 degrees to the left.  
This configuration shows the tendency for higher severity risks to be over stated. 
An examination of the relationship between the elements of Figure 3.1 
reveals some very interesting observations.  First, is the tendency to 
underestimate the likelihood of higher probability risks.  Second, the lower 
probability risks are overestimated. 
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This is borne out by the data shown in Figure 3.1.  The percentage of 
lower likelihood occurrence risks is significantly smaller than in the middle of the 
range.  This follows the theory put forth by Schwarz [Schwarz, 1990]. 
An examination of the relationships between the elements in Figure 3.3 
also produces some interesting observations.  The tendency is to overestimate 
the consequence of a higher consequence risk.  The data shows that there are a 
larger percentage of higher consequence risks than lower consequence.  This fits 








One example of Prospect Theory and the Risk Cube in action took place 
at a major aerospace company from 2004 to 2005.  A project was underway to 
develop a new and upgraded piece of avionics hardware.  This hardware was a 
replacement for an obsolete unit.  One of the prime requirements was that the 
new unit be fully backwards compatible with the existing hardware, meaning that 
you could use the new unit any place you could use the old one.  
To ensure that this requirement was met, the specification for the new unit 
was intentionally made stricter than that of the obsolete unit.  This allowed for 
some degradation in the performance of the new unit and still ensured better 
performance than the unit it was replacing.  As a normal part of the development 
process, the requirements were documented and progress was verified on a 
regular basis. 
As the development progressed there was little indication that the unit was 
in danger of not meeting one of its important specification requirements until late 
in the development process.  Once the likelihood that the unit would not meet the 
required specification was disclosed by the supplier, a review was initiated.  This 
potential specification shortfall leads to the listing in the risk database.  The initial 
likelihood was determined to be a near certainty.  The consequence was also 
shown to be higher than was actually appropriate.  If, in fact, the specification 
was not met, the condition would not require disclosure to the final customer with 
the possibility of a waiver required. 
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The actual parameter that was at risk, while important, had plenty of 
margin in the requirements.  The replacement unit had over a +30% margin in 
performance over the legacy unit, so there was little chance of not meeting the 
specification requirement to the customer.  
An analysis of the situation showed that, while the lower value of the 
parameter that was achievable was indeed out of specification, there was 
adequate margin in the systems design.  The lower limit was adopted and the 
project continued to a successful conclusion. 
The initial overestimation of the likelihood and the overestimation of the 
consequence of this situation illustrate the relationship of the risk management 







The data show clear evidence that the human cognitive biases concerning 
the judgment of probabilities and values are present in industry. The order of 
development of this conclusion was as follows:  
1)  The biases were predicted by theory. 
2)  The historical data from two programs within one company confirmed 
the predictions.  
Confirmation from data from other industries or companies should be the 
subject of future papers. 
The data also indicates that how and when the risk is presented will 
influence its level of likelihood and consequence.   
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The data shows that risk cubes are not absolutely objective number grids, 
but relative and useful means of verifying that risk items have received risk 
attention.   It seems clear that research needs to be undertaken to investigate 
whether there is a better way of quantifying risks that the ubiquitous risk cube. 
Further research also needs to be done in the area of quantifying the 
relationships predicted by prospect theory and risk classification.  For instance, is 
there a way to help determine if the risk was the subject of a cognitive bias?   
Further research needs to be done in the area of psychological impacts in 
the risk categorization process.  The work done by [Slovic, Finucane, Peters and 
MacGregor, 2002] is a good starting point, but needs to be expanded.  The work 
done by Kunreuther and Slovic [Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996] can also be 





Risk ID L C Risk ID L C Risk ID L C 
1 3 4 45 3 4 90 4 3 
2 3 3 46 2 3 91 3 3 
3 3 3 48 4 2 92 2 2 
4 3 2 49 2 3 93 2 2 
5 1 2 50 3 4 94 4 4 
6 3 2 51 2 3 95 3 1 
7 4 1 52 3 3 96 4 4 
8 3 1 53 3 3 97 3 3 
9 1 1 54 3 2 99 3 3 
10 4 1 55 3 3 100 2 3 
11 3 2 56 3 2 101 2 1 
12 2 3 57 3 3 102 2 3 
13 1 1 58 3 2 103 3 4 
14 3 4 59 2 3 104 3 4 
15 2 2 60 3 3 105 4 4 
16 2 2 61 4 3 106 3 3 
17 2 2 62 3 4 107 2 2 
18 3 2 63 3 5 108 3 3 
19 1 1 64 3 3 109 2 3 
20 1 5 65 3 4 110 2 2 
21 1 1 66 4 3 111 2 3 
22 4 3 67 3 4 112 1 3 
23 4 3 68 3 4 113 3 3 
24 1 1 69 3 4 114 1 3 
25 3 3 70 3 4 115 2 3 
26 3 3 71 2 4 116 1 4 
27 1 1 72 3 4 117 4 1 
28 4 2 73 2 3 118 2 3 
29 3 3 74 3 3 119 2 3 
30 4 2 75 4 4 120 3 3 
31 1 1 76 4 3 121 3 3 
32 3 4 77 2 4 122 3 2 
33 3 3 78 3 3 123 1 3 
34 3 4 79 3 3 124 1 3 
35 2 4 80 3 4 125 4 3 
36 3 2 81 2 4 126 4 3 
37 2 2 82 4 4 127 3 4 
38 3 3 83 3 4 128 3 2 
39 3 4 84 3 3 129 3 3 
40 3 4 85 3 2 130 2 4 
41 3 4 86 3 4 131 2 5 
42 3 5 87 4 3 132 2 4 
43 3 3 88 4 2 134 2 3 








Risk ID L C Risk ID L C Risk ID L C 
137 3 4 184 4 4 237 3 4 
138 3 4 185 1 1 238 4 4 
139 2 3 186 1 1 239 3 4 
140 3 4 187 1 3 240 3 4 
143 4 3 188 1 2 241 4 3 
144 3 2 189 3 4 242 2 3 
145 3 2 190 3 4 243 2 4 
146 5 1 191 3 2 244 2 3 
147 3 3 193 4 4 245 2 3 
148 4 3 194 4 4 246 1 2 
149 1 5 195 2 2 247 1 1 
150 3 4 196 3 4 248 1 1 
151 4 3 197 3 4 249 5 4 
152 4 3 206 3 3 250 3 4 
153 4 3 207 3 4 251 3 3 
154 4 3 208 3 3 252 5 5 
155 4 3 209 4 2 258 4 4 
156 4 4 210 3 3 259 1 5 
157 4 3 211 1 2 260 3 4 
158 2 3 212 3 2 261 5 5 
159 3 3 213 2 4 263 4 4 
160 3 4 214 3 2 264 4 3 
161 3 4 215 4 4 265 3 3 
162 2 4 216 3 4 266 4 5 
163 3 3 217 3 3 267 3 4 
164 3 4 218 5 3 268 3 3 
165 3 4 219 3 4 269 3 3 
166 3 3 220 3 4 270 4 5 
167 3 4 221 3 5 271 3 4 
168 3 4 222 4 4 272 4 3 
169 3 3 223 4 4 273 3 3 
170 4 4 224 3 4 274 3 3 
171 4 3 225 2 4 275 3 3 
172 3 4 226 3 3 276 3 3 
173 3 3 227 3 4 277 1 5 
174 4 3 228 3 3 278 3 3 
175 4 4 229 5 3 279 3 4 
176 4 3 230 3 3 280 4 3 
177 4 3 231 3 3 281 4 4 
178 3 4 232 3 4 282 3 3 
179 4 4 233 3 4 283 3 3 
181 2 4 234 4 4 286 5 4 
182 3 4 235 4 4 287 3 4 








Risk ID L C Risk ID L C Risk ID L C 
290 5 3 345 3 3 389 3 2 
291 3 4 346 3 4 390 3 4 
293 2 5 347 4 4 391 3 4 
294 3 3 348 3 4 392 3 3 
295 5 3 349 5 4 393 4 3 
296 3 3 350 2 3 394 1 2 
297 4 4 351 2 2 395 3 2 
298 3 2 352 3 2 396 4 3 
299 4 4 353 3 4 397 2 3 
300 3 3 354 4 4 398 2 3 
301 4 4 355 3 4 399 1 4 
303 2 3 356 2 4 400 4 3 
305 4 4 357 4 4 401 1 1 
306 4 4 358 3 4 402 3 4 
308 3 3 359 3 4 403 2 5 
309 3 4 360 3 3 404 4 4 
310 5 5 361 3 3 405 1 3 
311 4 5 362 5 3 406 1 1 
317 4 5 363 3 4 407 3 2 
318 4 4 364 4 3 408 3 4 
319 4 4 365 3 3 409 5 2 
320 4 4 366 4 4 410 4 3 
321 2 5 367 2 3 411 5 3 
323 4 4 368 3 3 412 5 5 
324 3 3 369 4 3 413 3 4 
325 2 3 370 2 2 414 4 5 
326 3 3 371 2 2 415 3 5 
327 2 3 372 4 3 416 2 5 
328 3 3 373 3 4 417 4 3 
329 4 4 374 4 2 418 3 4 
330 4 4 375 3 3 419 4 3 
332 3 3 376 4 4 423 4 3 
333 3 3 377 4 3 424 3 2 
334 4 4 378 2 4 425 3 3 
335 3 4 379 2 2 426 3 3 
336 3 4 380 3 4 427 5 4 
337 3 4 381 2 5 428 2 3 
338 3 4 382 3 4 429 3 3 
339 2 2 383 4 3 430 3 2 
340 5 2 384 4 4 431 3 4 
341 4 2 385 3 2 432 3 3 
342 3 3 386 3 4 433 3 4 
343 3 3 387 2 2 434 3 3 








Risk ID L C Risk ID L C Risk ID L C 
436 4 2 497 4 4 561 2 3 
437 3 2 498 2 3 562 2 3 
438 4 3 500 3 3 563 3 4 
439 5 3 501 3 2 564 2 3 
440 3 4 502 3 3 565 3 3 
441 3 3 506 1 2 566 3 3 
442 3 4 507 3 3 567 3 3 
443 4 4 508 2 2 568 3 4 
444 5 4 509 2 2 569 4 4 
445 3 4 511 2 2 570 2 4 
446 3 2 521 2 2 571 3 3 
447 3 2 523 2 2 572 2 3 
448 3 2 524 2 2 573 2 4 
449 3 2 526 2 2 574 2 4 
450 5 3 528 2 2 575 4 5 
451 3 3 529 2 2 576 4 5 
452 3 3 530 2 2 577 4 3 
453 3 3 531 2 2 578 3 3 
454 3 4 532 2 2 579 3 3 
455 3 3 533 2 2 580 3 3 
456 4 4 536 2 2 581 3 4 
457 3 3 537 2 2 582 2 2 
458 1 1 538 4 3 583 3 3 
459 1 1 540 1 4 584 2 2 
460 3 4 541 1 4 585 2 2 
461 3 3 542 2 2 586 3 3 
462 3 3 543 4 3 587 2 2 
463 3 3 544 2 4 588 3 3 
464 2 3 545 5 2 589 3 2 
465 2 3 546 3 3 590 4 3 
466 4 5 547 4 4 591 4 4 
467 3 4 548 3 3 592 1 2 
468 3 3 549 3 3 593 2 2 
470 1 4 550 4 4 594 3 3 
471 3 3 551 1 5 595 3 3 
478 2 2 552 3 3 596 1 1 
479 2 2 553 4 3 597 3 4 
481 1 2 554 2 4 598 4 3 
482 2 2 555 3 4 599 3 4 
483 2 2 556 2 4 600 2 5 
484 4 4 557 2 2 601 3 5 
487 2 2 558 4 2 602 4 3 
495 3 3 559 2 2 603 3 4 








Risk ID L C Risk ID L C Risk ID L C 
605 3 3 649 2 5 693 3 3 
606 3 3 650 2 4 694 4 4 
607 4 5 651 4 4 695 3 2 
608 4 4 652 3 3 696 3 4 
609 5 4 653 4 4 697 4 4 
610 3 5 654 2 2 698 2 2 
611 2 4 655 3 4 699 3 2 
612 2 3 656 3 4 700 2 2 
613 3 3 657 5 3 701 3 2 
614 3 3 658 3 4 702 3 2 
615 3 5 659 4 4 703 3 2 
616 3 4 660 3 4 704 3 2 
617 2 3 661 2 4 705 2 2 
618 3 4 662 5 3 706 2 2 
619 4 3 663 2 2 707 3 2 
620 4 3 664 3 2 708 3 2 
621 4 3 665 2 2 709 3 3 
622 3 2 666 4 3 710 3 3 
623 3 2 667 3 3 711 3 3 
624 4 3 668 2 2 712 3 3 
625 4 5 669 2 3 713 3 3 
626 3 3 670 4 4 714 3 3 
627 4 4 671 2 3 715 3 3 
628 3 3 672 3 3 716 3 3 
629 5 4 673 3 3 717 3 3 
630 4 4 674 3 3 718 3 3 
631 3 4 675 4 4 719 3 3 
632 3 4 676 4 4 720 3 3 
633 3 3 677 4 4       
634 2 2 678 4 4       
635 4 5 679 2 5       
636 4 3 680 4 5       
637 3 4 681 3 4       
638 2 2 682 3 4       
639 3 4 683 3 4       
640 3 4 684 5 4       
641 3 5 685 3 3       
642 4 3 686 3 4       
643 4 3 687 2 3       
644 3 3 688 4 3       
645 3 3 689 3 3       
646 2 3 690 2 3       
647 3 4 691 5 4       
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